by its own choice and power; hence, for it to be in motion, there must be something that necessitates this. Otherwise, temporal events (1) would occur without anyone bringing them about.

If it is argued:

The entity that acts necessarily by virtue of its very essence is the determining cause or agent (2), whether through an intermediary or without one; the intermediary (3) is the intellect or intellects (4) that emanated from it.

The reply is:

This is false, because, according to them, an entity that acts necessarily by virtue of its essence remains in one and the same state (5) from eternity past to eternity future. It is therefore impossible for a temporal event to proceed from it after that event had not previously proceeded from it. Every segment of motion is a temporal event that comes into being after not having existed (6). It is therefore impossible for [that temporal event] to have existed (7) in eternity past. Consequently, its agent cannot have been a fully sufficient cause in eternity past. (8 It is thus known that these temporal events cannot proceed from a fully sufficient cause in eternity past 8) (8).

Furthermore, if the determining cause of temporal events was a fully sufficient determining cause (9) in eternity past, its effect would necessarily have accompanied it, and nothing would subsequently have arisen from it. If it was not a fully sufficient determining cause (10) in eternity past, then it became a determining cause after not having been one. It is impossible that something other than itself made it a determining cause. Accordingly, what made it a determining cause must have been something subsisting in it, such as its will or the like; yet those things (11) were not