that they have (1) an agent, although Allah is unquestionably their agent. It therefore (2) denies Him (3) His status as Creator of His creatures.

As for shirk, it follows because they say that the servant independently originates this act, without Allah making him its originator—like the assistants of kings, who perform deeds without the kings having made them the agents of those deeds. This amounts to affirming partners alongside Allah who create just as some (4) of His creatures create.

These two objectionable consequences—denial of divine agency and associating partners with Allah in His Lordship—unavoidably follow (5) for anyone who affirms the existence of an agent independent of Allah. This includes the philosophers who say that the celestial sphere moves (6) of its own volition and that, through this movement, occurrences come into being without anything having occurred on Allah’s part to necessitate its movement, or any newly occurring thing above it (7) requiring its movement. For, on that supposition, the celestial sphere’s movement by its own choice would be like a human being’s movement by his own choice.

The reply is that the celestial sphere’s coming to move by its own choice and power (8) is contingent, not necessary in itself. There must accordingly be [for it] (9) a fully sufficient determining cause, yet at every moment it is moving