And it makes no difference whether it is said:
That complete cause is an essence divested of attributes, as maintained by the philosophers who deny the attributes, such as Ibn Sīnā and his like;
or whether it is said:
He is an essence (1) described by attributes, yet one that necessarily entails its effect—for this too is false (2).
If (3) “acting by intrinsic necessity” is interpreted to mean that, by His will and power, He necessarily brings about (4) each one [one] (5) of created things at the time when He brought it into being (6), then this is the religion of the Muslims and of other religious communities, and the position of Ahl al-Sunnah. Thus, when they say, “By His will and power, He necessarily brings about (7) the acts of His servants and other (8) temporal events,” then [this] (9) accords with this meaning, not the meaning espoused by the eternalists.
The Sixth Aspect:
It may be said: (10) The rational argument you mentioned—namely, that our voluntary acts are attributable to us and occur according to our choice—is countered by things that are not among our acts, such as colors. A person, according to his choice, produces the color he wishes to appear in a cloth, and it is attributable to his nature and craftsmanship (11); nevertheless, the color is not his act.