by this that the effect must necessarily exist upon the existence (1) of the determining factor—which, for example, is the will—together with power?

If (2) you mean the first, the alleged necessary implication is not conceded, (3) for the supposition (4) is that He has power and that His action is determined [by a determining factor] (5). Thus, there are two things here: power and something else, which we have explained as the will. How, then, can it be said that His action is determined without power or will?

But if you mean that the effect must necessarily exist once will is present together with power, then this is true, and it is the position of the Muslims. If anyone calls this “acting by intrinsic necessity,” the dispute is merely verbal.

The Muslims say: Whatever Allah wills comes to pass, and whatever He does not will does not come to pass. Whatever Allah wills to exist must necessarily exist by His will and power, while whatever He does not will to exist cannot exist, because His will and power are not directed toward bringing it into existence. (6) The former is necessary by virtue of His will, whereas the latter is impossible because it is not willed. As for the claim of the Qadariyya that Allah wills what does not come to pass and that what He does not will comes to pass, (7) this is precisely what Ahl al-Sunnah wa’l-Jamā'ah condemned them for.

Fourth, it may be said to him: (8) He—glory be to Him—is able. If He wills something within His power to come into being (9), then either it must necessarily exist or it need not. If it must, this yields