give preference on the basis of power alone, but rather because of a motive coupled with that power, as most of those who affirm divine decree also maintain. For they say that the Exalted Lord does not determine one possibility over another by power alone, but by will together with power.

Likewise, many of them say concerning the servant that he does not determine one possibility over another by power alone,

(1 but rather because of a motive together with power. 1)

(1)

Many followers of the four imams have held this view. Among Ahmad’s followers, it was held by Judge Abū Khāzim (2), son of Judge Abū Ya‘lā] (3).

It has already been explained that the moderate position on this matter is that the servant’s power has a causal effect of the same kind as causes have upon their effects (4). Its effect is not one of creation and origination, yet neither is its existence equivalent to its absence.

The reasoning behind this proof (5) is that an agent endowed with power cannot prefer one of two alternatives within his power (6) except through a determining factor. [This is because (7), when action and inaction stand in exactly the same relation to the agent, preferring one over the other would amount to preferring one of two equivalent alternatives over the other without a determining factor. This is impossible according to the first principles (8) of reason.

This has been discussed at length elsewhere, where the error was demonstrated (9) of those who claimed that an agent endowed with power