necessarily entails compulsion, and that the very fact that the motive and power necessarily entail the occurrence of the act is ‘compulsion.’”
The reply is:
“This meaning is true, and you have no evidence by which to invalidate it. The most discerning Muʿtazilites, such as Abū al-Husayn al-Basrī and others like him, concede this. They concede that when the motive and power are present, the act must necessarily occur.
“The author of this book has adopted this approach, so he cannot, while doing so, deny compulsion as thus defined. This is why(1) Abū al-Husayn was charged with contradiction on this issue. For if he and other discerning Muʿtazilites concede that the act must necessarily occur when the motive and power are present, and also concede that Allah created the motive and power, it necessarily follows that Allah is(2) the Creator of the servants’ acts.
“Thus, the most discerning Muʿtazilites conceded both premises but denied the conclusion. Al-Tūsī—whom this Imāmī has held in such high esteem—stated in Talkhīs al-Muhassal, when presenting al-Rāzī’s argument, that the act must necessarily occur when the complete determining factor is present and is impossible in its absence. The Muʿtazilite position was therefore invalidated(3) in its entirety(4)—meaning the position of those who maintain that the servant acts in a manner
(1) (A), (B): “and for this reason.”
(2) “is” is omitted from (A) and (B).
(3) (B) only: “was thereby invalidated.”
(4) Al-Rāzī states in *al-Muhassal*, p. 141: “The majority of the Muʿtazila maintain that the servant originates his own acts—not by way of necessitation, but by choice. We have several arguments. The first is that, at the time of acting, the servant is either able to refrain from the act or unable to do so. If he is unable to refrain, the Muʿtazilite position is thereby invalidated. If he is able, then either the preponderance of acting over refraining requires no determining factor—which is false, because it would permit one of two possible alternatives to prevail over the other without a determining factor—or it does require one. If that determining factor is one of his own acts, the same division recurs, resulting in an infinite regress. Rather, the chain must inevitably end with a determining factor that is not one of his own acts. Once that determining factor is present, if the act can still fail to occur, let us suppose that it does fail to occur. The act would then occur at one time and not at another, even though the determining factor bears the same relation to both times. Singling out one time for its occurrence and the other for its nonoccurrence would therefore mean that one of two equally possible alternatives prevailed over the other without a determining factor, which is impossible. If, however, it is impossible for the act not to occur, the Muʿtazilite position is entirely invalidated: whenever the determining factor is present, the act necessarily occurs, and whenever it is absent, the act is impossible. The servant is therefore not independent in his choice. This is a decisive argument.”