Whoever says that the servant’s will and act came about without a cause necessitating their occurrence; that the servant brought this about while his state at the time was the same as it had been before; indeed, that he singled out one of the two times to bring it about without (1) any cause necessitating that specification; and that he came to will, act, and bring things about after not having been so (2), without anything making him so—has thereby maintained that originated events can occur without an agent.

If they say, “Volition is not subject to causal explanation,” [this] (3) is an assertion with no reality to it. Volition is an originated matter and must therefore have one who brought it into being.

This resembles their claim that the Creator brings into being a volition inhering in no substrate, without either a cause necessitating its occurrence or any volition. They have thus committed (4) three absurdities: an originated event (5) coming into being without any volition on Allah’s part; an originated event coming into being without an originated cause; and an attribute subsisting by itself rather than in a substrate.

Or, if you wish, you may say: His being willing is contingent, and a contingent thing (6) cannot [have its existence preponderate over its nonexistence, nor can] (7) one of its two alternatives preponderate over the other except through a complete determinant.

This is among the arguments al-Rāzī uses against them. It is sound in itself, but he contradicted himself concerning the temporal origination of the world (8).