deters him only from what has not yet occurred, and Allah has not willed what has not occurred.

Thus, if someone were to swear, “I shall certainly steal this property, if Allah wills,” but did not steal it, he would not have broken his oath, by Muslim consensus, because Allah did not will that he steal it.

For the Qadariyya, however, the divine will (1) means nothing but a command. They therefore claim that if theft is willed, it must have been commanded. Yet the Muslims have unanimously agreed—and it is necessarily known from their religion—that Allah has not commanded theft. Whoever says that the theft which occurred was willed maintains that it was willed but not commanded. No one says that it was commanded except an unbeliever.

This objection may, however, be directed (2) at the antinomians who invoke (3) the divine decree to justify sins. Some of them believe that a person should not be opposed regarding sins thought to have been decreed for him (4), while others even believe that he should be assisted in committing them, on the grounds that they are willed. By acting thus (5)—although the act itself is prohibited and sinful—they have not impeded what Allah wills. It is therefore clear that impeding what Allah wills does not actually occur under any possible scenario.

The second:

It may be said: It has already been established (6) that people restrain one another from sins, vile deeds, and wrongdoing; restrain the wrongdoer (7); recover the wronged party’s right from him; and refute the argument of