The first is that this entails an infinite regress. For if He acts (1) for a purpose, that purpose is itself originated and therefore requires another purpose—if every originated thing must have a purpose. Yet if bringing something into existence without a purpose is conceivable, there is no need to posit a purpose.

They therefore say: If it is possible to bring something into existence without a purpose, then no purpose need be posited, nor would such an act be futile. But if bringing something into existence can occur only for a purpose, then whatever is said regarding the origination of that purpose also applies to the origination of the effect, and this entails an infinite regress.

The second argument is that they said: Whoever acts for a purpose derives perfection from it, for if realizing that purpose were no better than not realizing it, it would not be a purpose. Yet one who derives perfection from something else is intrinsically deficient, and this is impossible for Allah.

They also advanced against the Mu'tazila and those Shi'a who agreed with them an argument that refutes them according to their own principles. They said: If the existence and nonexistence of the purpose for which He acted were equal in relation (2) to Him, it could not be a purpose. But if its existence were preferable, then, if it were external to Him, it would follow that He derives perfection from something other than Himself; and if it inhered in Him, it would follow that He is a locus for originated events.

Those who allow purposiveness themselves disagree. The Mu'tazila and their Shi'a followers affirm an inconceivable form of purposiveness: namely, that He acted for a purpose external to the agent, even though its existence and nonexistence were equal [in relation] (3) to Him.

As for those of Ahl al-Sunnah who affirm purposiveness, they say: Allah loves