As for those who hold that speech is subject to His will and power, most of them maintain that He speaks for a wise purpose and acts for a wise purpose, and that He—glorified is He—is far above committing (1) evil deeds. Their proofs that He is above committing evil deeds are greater and stronger than those of the Muʿtazila. Indeed, every proof establishing that He is above performing an evil act external to Him establishes, with even greater reason, that He is above performing an evil act that subsists in Him. That evils subsisting in Him would constitute a deficiency is more evident than that performing reprehensible acts external to Him would constitute a deficiency. Thus, if performing such external acts is impossible, then evil subsisting in Him is all the more impossible.

[The Sixth Argument] (2): It may be said that rational proofs establish the impossibility of His being characterized—glorified is He—by deficiencies and evils, for one is characterized by such things only insofar as they subsist in one. Speech subsists in the speaker; it is therefore impossible for Him to speak falsely, because His speech subsists in Him. Hence, it is impossible for an evil of His choosing to subsist in Him. This line of reasoning is exclusive to those who affirm the divine attributes in establishing that He is above falsehood. The Muʿtazila cannot employ it, because in their view His speech is separate from Him.

Thus, if [these] (3) affirmers say to them: “The proof establishes only that He is above being characterized in Himself by evil deeds and above performing them. An act is that which subsists in the agent, whereas what is separate from Him is an effect produced by Him, not His act. You have presented no proof that such a thing cannot occur among His effects, which is precisely the point in dispute,” then their argument would be (4) a manifest proof against the Qadariyya.