and therefore it is not permissible for us to assist in sin [or] transgression (1), as Allah (2) has forbidden. If what is reprehensible on His part is also reprehensible on ours, they would then be required to deem it possible for Him to lie if He assists in lying, and the inadmissible consequence would follow for them (3).

If they say, “He gave him the capacity only so that he might obey, not disobey,”

it is said: If He knew that he would disobey, this would be like someone who gives (4) a man a sword so that he may fight the disbelievers, while knowing that he will use it to kill a prophet. This is not permissible for us, for anyone who performs an act for a purpose while knowing that the purpose (5) will not thereby be achieved would, in our case, be foolish—and Allah Most High is far above that. It is thus known that the ruling governing His acts differs from that governing the acts of His servants (6). If they account for this by a rationale that could be valid, they are told: “Likewise, what He creates in another has a wise purpose, just as enabling him to perform it by granting him the capacity has a wise purpose.”

The third aspect:

It may be said: Not everything that He has power to do and that is possible is something about whose occurrence we are uncertain. Rather, we know with self-evident certainty that He does not do certain things, even though He has power over them and they are possible. Thus, we know that He does not turn the seas into oils, the mountains into rubies, all human beings (7) into foxes, or the sun and moon into two sprigs of sweet basil—and there are countless similar things. Yet our knowledge that Allah is far above lying and that lying is impossible for Him is even greater than our knowledge of this.