entail circular reasoning.

Then they say:

“It is known (1) by necessity that there is a difference between the movement of one who acts voluntarily and the movement of one who suffers from tremors.”

This statement is sound, but it is evidence against them, not for them. The distinction cannot lie in one of the two movements being intended while the other is not, since a person may intend someone else’s action. The distinction therefore comes down to this: with respect to one of the two, the servant has a power by which the act occurs, whereas he has no such power with respect to the other. The act is the acquisition; it is inconceivable that two things should subsist in the same locus, one being an act and the other an acquisition.

[A section from the Rāfidī’s discussion of the position of Ahl al-Sunnah on divine decree—“Among its implications is that we must seek refuge with Iblīs from Allah Most High”—and the response to it]

(Section)

The [Rāfidī] said: (2)

“Another implication is that we would have to (3) seek refuge (4) with Iblīs from Allah Most High, and the following words of Allah Most High would not be fitting:

‘Seek refuge in Allah from Satan, the accursed.’

[Surah al-Nahl: 98]

For they have declared Iblīs (* and the unbeliever innocent of (5) acts of disobedience and attributed those acts to Allah Most High. Allah Most High would therefore be worse toward those held morally accountable than Iblīs *) (6) is toward them. Allah is far exalted above that.”

The response is: This is a baseless argument (7), for several reasons: