the created things, any power or inherent nature through which an event comes about; nor is there in them any wise purpose for whose sake it occurs. Nor did He command anything for a reason, prohibit it for a reason, or choose any angel or prophet because of any quality inherent in him (1). Nor did He permit wholesome things and prohibit vile things because of any quality that made the former wholesome and the latter vile. Nor did He command the thief’s hand to be cut off in order to safeguard (2) people’s property, or command the punishment of violent highway robbers in order to prevent people from wronging one another. Nor did He send down rain so that animals might drink and plants might grow (3).

They say the same about everything else He created. They maintain, however, that whenever one finds a benefit or harm accompanying something, He created the one together with the other—not for its sake and not through it. Likewise, the person subject to the command finds it (4) accompanying this, but neither through it nor for its sake. He has merely made this concomitance customary, without any wise purpose or cause. Accordingly, in their view, deeds are nothing but bare signs and indications, owing solely to their customary concomitance, not to any wise purpose or cause (5). Each of these two positions contains contradictions that can scarcely be counted.

Yet when this Imāmī Qadarī set about citing contradictions in the views of Ahl al-Sunnah categorically, it was made clear to him (6) that all the Qadariyyah are incapable of establishing proof against (7) their opponents among those who uphold compulsion, just as the Rāfidah (8) are incapable of establishing proof against their opponents