Indeed, their position concerning speech entails that one in whom speech subsists is not a speaker, because the speaker(1), according to them, is one who brings about speech in another. This is contrary to reason.

The same applies to their position concerning His pleasure, anger, love, will, and other such attributes: they maintain that these do not subsist in His Essence but are matters separate from Him(2). They thereby ascribed to Him things that do not subsist in Him but are separate from Him(3). This is contrary to reason and is, moreover, self-contradictory. For(4) it follows that He must be described by every created thing He brings into being(5), including every instance of speech He creates, which would therefore be His speech. Thus, whenever He causes any of His creatures to speak(6), that would be His speech rather than the speech of the one He causes to speak(7). This is discussed fully elsewhere.

The point here is that their claim that He acts for a wise purpose necessarily entails that the existence of that wise purpose is preferable in His sight to its absence, or that it(8) subsists in Him, as well as other necessary concomitants without which one who acts for a wise purpose cannot be conceived. Otherwise, if it is posited that all originated things stand in an equal relation to Him and it is impossible(9) for some of them to be preferable in His sight to others, it is likewise impossible(10) for Him to bring about some of them for the sake of others.

Then, when the Jahmiyyah who upheld compulsion saw the corruption of the position of these Qadariyyah, although they shared with them(11)