every respect, he would be among the most foolish of fools, if such a person could exist(1)—so what of the fact that this is impossible? Indeed, a volitional agent cannot do anything unless it comes to preponderate for him, such that doing it becomes dearer to him than not doing it; and giving precedence to what is dearer constitutes pleasure and benefit.
Thus, these Qadariyya who explain divine action in terms of purpose(2) are(3) the very ones who posit what cannot possibly constitute a purpose(4) and can(5) only be either impossible or an act of foolishness. If they affirm(6) a purpose subsisting in Him, it necessarily follows that He is a subject in which temporally originated events subsist—something they deem impossible. Moreover, if that purpose exists for another purpose, an infinite regress necessarily follows, which they deem impossible with respect to the past; as for the future, they hold two views. If it does not exist for another purpose, then it may arise without any purpose. Thus, the principles upon which they and those who affirm divine decree agree constitute an argument for the latter against them(7).
[Section: Whoever Denies That Volitional Acts Subsist in the Essence of the Exalted Lord Must Inevitably Espouse Contradictory and Corrupt Positions]
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(Section)(8)
Broadly speaking, whoever denies that volitional acts subsist in the Essence of the Exalted Lord must inevitably espouse contradictory and corrupt positions. Since(9) the Jahmiyya who uphold compulsion and the Mu'tazilite Qadariyya