and love and approval.
As for anyone who regards all of them as a single kind, he faces one of two alternatives: if he regards love and approval as belonging to this kind, those abhorrent consequences necessarily follow for him(1). But if he regards love and approval as a kind that does not entail will, and says(2): “He may love and approve of something that He does not will in any way,” then what he means by saying, “He does not will it”(3), is that He does not will its occurrence or existence; otherwise, according to him, He loves it and approves of it.
Such a person identifies will with the volition to create. Although this terminology is used by a group of jurists affiliated with the Sunnah—followers of Mālik, al-Shāfiī, and Ahmad—it is contrary to(4) the usage of the Book and the Sunnah. Accordingly, the disagreement with him is merely verbal. In verbal disputes, the person with the strongest claim to being correct is the one whose terminology accords with the wording of the Quran.
It has already become clear that the Quran(5) regards this kind as something willed, so there is no need to make the unqualified(6) assertion that Allah commands what He does not will. It then became clear(7) that will is of two kinds and that He commands [whatever He wills(8); thus, He commands](9) what He does not Himself will to create. Yet He commands only what He loves for His servants(10) and approves of their doing.