As for one group among those who affirm the divine decree, they supposed that will is of only one kind, [and that it(1) is identical with volition](2). They therefore said, “He commands what He does not will(3).”

These people then fall into two groups:

One group said, “He commands what He loves and with which He is pleased, even if He does not will it—that is, does not will it to come into existence.” This is the position held by most jurists and others who espouse this view.

The other group said, “Rather, love and approval are the same as will, and will is the same as volition. Thus, He commands what He neither wills nor loves nor approves of. As for whatever disbelief and iniquity actually occurred, according to(4) these people, He loved and approved of it(5), just as it was subject to His will and volition. Yet they say(6), ‘He neither loves nor approves of it in the religious sense, just as He does not will it in the religious sense [nor exercise volition concerning it in the religious sense](7). Nor does He love or approve of it on the part of anyone from whom it does not occur, [just as He did not will it on the part of anyone from whom it did not occur, nor exercise volition concerning it on the part of anyone from whom it did not occur](8).’”

This is the position of al-Asharī and most of his followers. He himself attributed it to a group among the affirmers, while a view like the position(9) first mentioned has also been related from him.

The adherents of this position—the Qadariyya(10) among the Mutazila and the Shia, and others—