and evil as rationally discernible that neither is a positive attribute of acts, nor does either entail a positive attribute in them; rather, they are relative and relational attributes. Thus, a good act is one of which it is said, “Do it,” or, “There is no harm in doing it,” while an evil act is one of which it is said, “Do not do it” (1).

They said: “What the statement concerns derives no positive attribute from the statement itself.” They reported that their opponents maintained that legal rulings are intrinsic attributes (2) of acts, and refuted this by pointing out that the rulings governing an act may change even though its kind (3) remains the same.

The true account is that the rulings governing acts are not inseparable attributes; rather, [they] (4) are accidental properties of acts, according to their agreeableness or repugnance. Goodness and evil, in this sense, consist in a thing’s being loved or hated, beneficial or harmful, agreeable or repugnant. This is a positive attribute subsisting in the subject, but it varies as the subject’s circumstances vary and is therefore not inseparable from it.

Anyone who says, “Acts possess no attributes that entail goodness or evil,” is like one who says, “Bodies possess no attributes that produce heating, cooling, satiation, or the quenching of thirst.” Denying that entities possess attributes that produce effects is thus like denying that acts possess attributes that produce effects.

As for the majority of Muslims, who affirm the real natures and attributes of entities, they likewise (5) affirm the goodness and evil present in acts in view of their agreeableness and repugnance, just as