His love for them and His pleasure with them when they occur, even if He does not cause them to occur; whereas He hates and detests acts of disobedience and hates for His servants *)(1) to commit them, even if He wills (2) to create them Himself because of a wisdom that requires this (3). It does not follow that, because He hates them (4) for the servant since they harm him [and He also hates them] (5), He must hate to create them Himself on account of the wisdom He has in them (6).
The same act may be proper when done by one created being and improper when done by another because the agents’ circumstances differ (7). How, then, can it follow that whatever is improper when done by the servant is also improper (8) when done by the Lord, when the creature is in no way comparable to the Creator? (9)
If a created being may (10) will something he does not love—as when a sick person wills to drink (11) medicine he dislikes (12)—and love something he does not will—as when a sick person loves food that harms him [or when a fasting person loves food and drink that he does not wish to consume, or a person loves desires that his reason and religion cause him to hate] (13), then it is intelligible that one may exist without the other, and that one of them does not necessarily entail