the celestial spheres and other things to exist. But this is false, for they exist and are plainly witnessed. They concede this and say that they are the effect of an eternal cause, which necessitates by its very essence, so that its effect does not lag behind it.

Since this is known by sound reason and they agree with it—indeed, it is the foundation of their doctrine—they are told:

Anything that necessarily entails temporal events cannot proceed from a cause that necessitates by its very essence, because temporal events come into existence one after another (1). Whatever comes into existence gradually cannot have parts that are eternal and beginningless, and thus cannot proceed from a cause that necessitates by its very essence. [It is therefore impossible for temporal events to proceed from a cause that necessitates by its very essence] (2). Nor can anything in the cosmos proceed without the temporal events that necessarily accompany it, since the existence of that which entails something without its necessary concomitant is impossible. It thus becomes clear that the celestial sphere cannot be eternal and beginningless.

Nor can it be said, “It was devoid of temporal events in pre-eternity, and then they occurred within it,” because the response would then be: Those temporal events must have a cause (3), and the argument concerning them is the same as the argument concerning other things. If they can occur without a temporally originated cause, the same would be possible for the celestial sphere, rendering their proof invalid. This would also entail choosing one of two identical alternatives without any determining factor. If, however, they must have a cause, this entails an infinite regress and the perpetual succession of temporal events, as well as that the celestial sphere and everything besides Allah have always been accompanied by temporal events (4). Every contingent thing accompanied by temporal events cannot proceed from a cause that necessitates by its very essence; hence, it cannot be eternal.