had always been its originator, that originated act would necessarily have existed perpetually. But if his originating (1) it is itself originated, it must have an originator.

If it is said, “Its originator is the servant’s will,” the response is: His will is also originated and must therefore have an originator. If it is said, “It came into existence (2) through a will on the servant’s part (3),” the response is: That will (must likewise have an originator. Whatever originator you posit within the servant (4), if it is originated, the same argument applies to it as to the first originated thing.) (5) If, however, you deem it pre-eternal and beginningless, this is impossible, because nothing inhering in the servant can be pre-eternal and beginningless.

If you say, “It is an attribute of the servant (6)—his power created within him, for example,” this does not help you (7), for several reasons. The first is that it may be said: If (8) [this] (9) power created within him exists both before the act comes into existence and when it comes into existence, there must (10) be another originated cause that joins it (11). Otherwise, one of two identical things would be preferred over the other (12) without a determinant, and originated events would come into existence without an originated cause. For otherwise, if (13) the servant’s state before