capacity to perform it that is concomitant with the act itself, then claiming (1) that such an obligation is impossible under this interpretation would be the very point in dispute, and denying its possibility would require evidence.

The Fourth Point (2): Among those who affirm divine predestination (3) are some who permit imposing an obligation that cannot be fulfilled because of one’s inability to fulfill it. Indeed, some of their extremists permit imposing an intrinsically impossible obligation. Some even claim that this occurs in the revealed law, as in Abū Lahab being commanded to believe while also being required to affirm the truth of Allah’s report that he would not believe. Although this position is less tenable, nevertheless (4), this Qadarite has presented no evidence to invalidate it or to answer their counterargument. Instead, he has contented himself with merely saying, “It is rationally reprehensible.”

They say: “Reason has no scope to judge anything good or evil.” If he does not carry the inquiry into these implications (5) to completion, what he has mentioned cannot constitute proof against them, much less against others who affirm divine predestination or against those who affirm the caliphate of Abū Bakr and Umar [may Allah be pleased with them both]. May Allah be pleased with them both: (6)

[Section: The Rāfidī’s Discussion of Voluntary Actions According to Ahl al-Sunnah and the Response to It]

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[The Rāfidī] (7) said: “Another is that it necessarily follows that our actions (8)