We have already explained (1) that whoever regards capacity as a single kind—either concurrent with the act (2) or preceding it—has (3) erred. This is the case when one of the two kinds is understood to mean the aggregate of everything that entails the act, as is the convention of many speculative thinkers. If, however, nothing is meant by capacity except that which renders the act possible, then it is a single kind.

People hold several views (4) concerning capacity and whether it exists together with the act or before it. The first is that it exists only together with the act. This is based on understanding it as that which entails the act, for such capacity exists only together with it. They may also base this (5) on the premise that capacity is an accident, and an accident does not endure for two moments.

The second is [that it] (6) exists only before the act, based on understanding it solely as that which renders the act possible and holding that it cannot be concurrent with the act.

The third is that it exists both before the act and together with it. This is the soundest view.

Among these, some say: Capacity is of two kinds: one that renders the act possible and another that entails it. The former exists before the act, while the latter exists together with it.

Others say: Rather, capacity is solely that which renders the act possible, and it exists both together with the act and before it. As for entailment, it results only from the presence of will together with capacity, not from the very thing (7)