Moreover, the capacity stipulated by Sacred Law is more restricted than the capacity without which the act is impossible (1). Capacity as defined by Sacred Law may be absent even though the act remains conceivable and the person is not incapable of performing it (2). The Lawgiver makes matters easy for His servants (3), desires ease for them and not hardship, and has placed no hardship upon them in religion (4).

A sick person may be capable of standing, but only at the cost of worsening his illness and delaying his recovery. Under Sacred Law, such a person is not deemed capable because standing would harm him, even though [some] people may describe him as capable (5).

Thus, in determining capacity under Sacred Law, the Lawgiver does not consider merely whether the act is possible; He also considers its consequences. If an act is possible only with a greater, overriding harm, this does not constitute capacity under Sacred Law. Examples include someone who can perform Hajj only at the cost of harm to his person or property; someone who can pray standing only if this worsens his illness; or someone who can fast for two months only at the cost of being cut off from his livelihood; and other similar cases (6). If the Lawgiver has made the absence of overriding harm a consideration in determining capability, how could He impose an obligation in the presence of incapacity?!

Yet even when this capacity remains until the time of the act, it is not sufficient for the act to occur. Were it sufficient, the one who refrains from acting would be like the one who acts. Rather, assistance must be brought about—