through it by way of harm, just as a ruler’s order that a wrongdoer be punished is pleasing to the ruler because of the wisdom it contains(1)—namely, his acting justly and commanding justice—while it harms the person punished because of the pain he suffers from it.

Suppose that this ruler were a cause of that wrongdoing taking place, in a manner for which he was not blameworthy; that would still not excuse the wrongdoer. This is like a judge before whom two witnesses(2) testify that money is owed to a creditor(3). He orders the debtor imprisoned or punished, until this drives him to take someone else’s property unlawfully in order to pay the creditor. The judge will then also punish him [for it](4). If he says, “You(5) imprisoned me when payment was beyond my means, and I had no(6) way to extricate myself except by taking this man’s property,” his initial imprisonment would have harmed him, and punishing him a second time for taking [another person’s] property(7) would likewise harm him. Yet the ruler says, “I rendered judgment on the testimony of upright witnesses, so I bear no sin for that. At most, I made a mistake, and when a judge errs, he receives a reward.” Each of the two men may cause the other(8) harm for which(9) he is excused, while the other is punished—indeed(10), wronged—but on the basis of an interpretive judgment.