they stated that love and pleasure are not the all-encompassing will that extends to every created thing. This was maintained by those who held this view among the followers of Abū Hanīfa [and of Mālik and al-Shāfiʿī], of Ahmad, and of others (1), such as Abū Bakr ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz and others. Another group, however, identifies love and pleasure with will, but the first view is more correct.

Moreover, there is an established distinction between a willing agent’s will (2) to act and his will that someone else should act (3). A command does not necessarily entail the second kind of will (4), rather than the first. Thus, when Allah Most High commands His servants to do something (5), He may will to assist the person commanded in carrying out what He has commanded him to do (6), or He may not will that, even though He wills that the person perform it (7).

A careful examination of this distinction clarifies the point at issue concerning Allah’s command: does it necessarily entail His will, or does it not? When the Muʿtazila claimed that He must will and intend whatever He commands, and claimed that whatever He forbids, He neither wills to exist nor intends, they were opposed by many (8) of the later affirmers of divine decree (9)—among the authors on the principles of jurisprudence [and others (10)] who followed Abū al-Hasan—from among the followers of