this orientation. Do you have [any] means (1) of dispelling this necessary knowledge and necessary orientation, which bind us in a manner that we cannot repel from ourselves? Only then establish the contrary.

As for refuting necessary truths by inferential arguments, that is impossible, because inferential arguments (2) can, at most, be established by necessary premises. Necessary truths are therefore the basis of inferential arguments. If necessary truths were impugned by inferential arguments, this would impugn the very basis of those arguments, thereby invalidating both the necessary truths and the inferential arguments. (3 It therefore follows that his objection is invalid in every case 3) (3) This is because a derivative argument’s attack on its own basis entails its own invalidity; and once it is invalid, its attack is likewise invalid. (* Its attack is therefore invalid on the [assumption] of its soundness (4) and on the assumption of its invalidity *) (5). For the soundness of such an argument necessarily entails the soundness of its basis: if the argument is sound, its basis must be sound. Its invalidity, however, does not entail the invalidity of its basis, since the flaw may lie in the argument itself. Were it to impugn its own basis, its invalidity would necessarily follow; and if it is invalid, its attack cannot be accepted. Thus, its attack cannot be accepted under any circumstances.

(* This is [because] (6) an inferential proof, which depends upon premises and their arrangement, may be invalid because this premise is invalid, because another premise is invalid, or because their arrangement is invalid. Hence, when the proof is invalid, it does not follow that every one of its premises is invalid. The premises are different in this respect: whenever any one of them is invalid, the proof is invalid. *) (7).