and when those possessed of knowledge share in what is denoted by “knowledge” (1), and two knowers share in what is denoted by “knower” (2), resemblance of this kind is not what is denied (3), whether by revealed law or by reason. Indeed, this cannot be denied without denying the existence of the Maker.

Moreover, an existent thing and a nonexistent thing may share in that each is known and mentioned: this one is known and mentioned, and that one is known and mentioned (4). There is nothing objectionable in affirming this. What is objectionable is to ascribe to either one something peculiar to the other. When we speak of ascribing distinctive properties, we mean ascribing a property like that distinctive property; for ascribing the very same property is absolutely impossible.

Names and attributes are therefore of two kinds. The first is peculiar to the Lord, such as God, Lord of the Worlds, and the like. Such a designation can never apply (5) to a servant. This is where the polytheists went astray when they set up equals to Allah.

The second comprises what may be predicated of a servant in a general sense, such as being living, knowing, and capable. It is never permissible for the servant to possess anything like what belongs to the Lord. For if the servant possessed the like of what belongs to Him (6), whatever is possible for one would necessarily be possible for the other, whatever is necessary for one would be necessary for the other, and whatever is impossible for one would be impossible for the other. This would entail the coexistence of contradictories, as previously explained.