From this arose the disagreement among people concerning the question (1) of the name and the thing named. Their disagreement resembles (2) this one. When you (3) look into [water or] a mirror (4) and say, “This is the sun,” or, “This is the moon,” your statement is correct. You do not mean that the actual object in the sky has come to be in the water or the mirror (5); rather, it has been seen in the mirror, appeared in the mirror, and manifested itself in the mirror.
Thus, if you say, “Universals exist in external reality,” [that is correct] (6). Likewise, it is correct to say that man, considered in himself, exists in external reality. Yet in external reality he can exist only as something determinate and particular, which no other externally existing thing shares with him in [actual fact] (7) (8).
This resolves many of the points that confused [many of] (9) the logicians and concerning which they erred. One example is their claim that an essence existing in external reality is distinct from existence (10), on the grounds that you can conceive of a triangle before knowing whether it exists. Upon this they based their distinction between intrinsic attributes and accidental concomitant attributes, along with other questions of theirs.
There is no doubt that a distinction exists between what is in the mind and what is in external reality. Accordingly, if