Moreover, the generality and universality ascribed to them, or the composition ascribed to them—such as the composition of a species from genus and differentia—are purely conceptual matters of the mind, with no existence in external reality. Nothing in external reality encompasses both this and that, [nor is there in external reality a human being composed of this and that] (1). Rather, a human being is characterized by this and that [and the other] (2): by an attribute whose counterpart is found in every human being, another whose counterpart is found in every animal, and another whose counterpart is found in every growing thing.
As for the very attribute inhering in him (3), and the very entity described in which the attribute inheres, there is no sharing or universality in either of them whatsoever, nor is that entity (4) composed of something universal and something particular.
This point is the source of error for many logicians concerning universals and for many theologians concerning the doctrine of “states.” It was because of this (5) that those among both groups who erred fell into error in theology (6) on matters related to it. (7 For the theologians likewise saw that things agree in some attributes and differ in others 7) (7), while what is common is identical with what is individuated (8). They therefore divided into two groups. One group affirmed that these things exist in external reality, but held that they were neither existent nor nonexistent, for if they were existent, they would be either existent entities or