[one] (1) of the two is distinguished from the other by its own particular reality (2), (* just as if it were said, “The two share in what is denoted by ‘reality,’ while each is distinguished from the other” *) (3) by its own particular existence.

The error arose only because existence was taken in an unqualified rather than a particular sense, whereas reality was taken in a particular rather than an unqualified sense. It is well known that each may exist (4) in an unqualified sense and may exist (5) in a particular sense. If both are taken in an unqualified sense, they are equal in generality; and if both are taken in a particular sense, they are equal in particularity. As for (6) taking one generally and the other particularly, there is no more reason to do this than the reverse.

The resolution of the specious argument is that they imagined (7) [that] (8), when it is said, “The two share in what is denoted by ‘existence,’” there must be, in external reality, a shared existence that is the very same in this as it is in that, and is thus the very thing shared by the two. Yet what is shared is not differentiated and therefore must have something to differentiate it.

This is an error. For the statement, “The two share in what is denoted by ‘existence,’” means that they resemble one another in that respect (9) and agree therein: this (10) exists, and that exists; neither, however, shares in the other’s very existence at all.