and such-and-such; rather, it is said that this term applies to this meaning and to that meaning. This is a linguistic matter, not a rational division.

There is, however, a rational division: the division of the meaning signified by the general term, where the subject of division is shared by all the resulting categories. Some have imagined that they could avoid this by treating(1) the term “existence” as graded in application, since(2) necessary existence is more perfect. This is like what is said of the terms “blackness” and “whiteness” as applied to the blackness of pitch and the blackness of the pupil, and to the whiteness of snow and the whiteness of ivory.

There is no doubt that universal meanings may vary in degree among their instances; indeed, most of them do. Designating this category by the term “graded” is merely a matter of convention. Hence, some have said that it is a kind of univocal predication(3), because the originator of the language did not coin the general term to denote the disparity found in one of the two instances, but rather the measure common to them.

In sum, the dispute over this is terminological. Univocal predication in the broad sense includes graded predication, whereas univocal predication whose meanings are equal is a counterpart to graded predication. If univocal predication(4) is divided into two types—broad and restricted—just as possibility is divided into general and special, the confusion disappears.

The point here is to recognize that the position of the majority of groups, among both earlier and later scholars,