because neither of them subscribes to the theory of states; rather, both say, “The existence of every thing is identical to its reality.” They therefore supposed that anyone who says, “The existence of every thing is identical to its reality,” must also say that(1) the term “existence” is predicated of both equivocally. For if it were univocal, the two would share a common element [and one would be distinguished from the other by what is peculiar to its own reality. What they share is not what distinguishes them; thus, the existence common to both](2) would not itself be the distinguishing reality.

Al-Rāzī, al-Āmidī, and others like them supposed that the only positions on this issue were this one and the position of those who say that the term is univocal (3 and that His existence is additional to His reality, as held by Abū Hāshim and his followers among the Muʿtazilah and Shiʿah, or Ibn Sīnā’s position that it is univocal 3)(3) [or gradational](4), although it(5) is qualified existence [of which every affirmative attribute is negated](6).

Some of the esoteric Qarmatians and the extremists among the Jahmiyyah held that these names are used literally of the servant but figuratively of the Lord. [They said this regarding the name “the Living”](7) and similar names. [Indeed, even regarding the name “thing,” Jahm and his followers would not call Him a thing(8), and it was reported of him that he called Him only “the powerful agent,” because, in his view, the servant is neither powerful nor