—the response is: this is not invariably the case. Rather, part of it may be lost while life and sensation remain in another part. At other times, life and sensation may depart from one part when they depart from another, as in the case of the heart.

In either case, life and sensation extend to the extent of the substrate in which they inhere. Spirits are of diverse kinds, and the knowledge, will, and other attributes inhering in them vary according to their diversity. The greater the entities bearing these attributes, the greater their attributes; and those that are lesser have correspondingly lesser attributes.

Moreover, according to them, the estimative faculty is a bodily faculty inhering in the body, even though it apprehends within sensible things that which is not sensible, such as friendship and enmity. Yet, according to them, such a meaning is not divided when its substrate is divided.

Furthermore, the faculty of sight in the eye inheres in a body that, according to them, is divisible, even though the faculty itself is not divided when its substrate is divided. Rather, continuity is a condition for it: if any part of its substrate were impaired, the faculty would be impaired, and no part of it would remain if any part whatsoever of that substrate were impaired. What, then, prevents life, knowledge, power, and will from inhering in one part of the spirit—if its parts are said to be distinguishable—on condition that they also inhere in the other part, so that continuity is a condition for being characterized by these attributes? (1) This is just as life and sensation are found in a part of the body, yet inhere in it only when it is connected in a certain manner.

A full discussion of (many of) (2) these matters is connected with the discussion of the human spirit, which is called the rational soul, and of the manner in which it is characterized by its attributes. It is through this that