The invalidity of your argument for denying the attributes has already been demonstrated, even though you call that tawhīd. Thus, the existence in external reality of a one in which nothing is distinguishable from anything else has not been established, such that it could be used to argue that knowledge of it is likewise indivisible and that the one who knows it is likewise indivisible.

Some of them have argued for the existence of that which is indivisible—in the sense they intend—by saying:

“Whatever exists in external reality is either simple or composite, and anything composite must ultimately depend upon something simple.”

This is not conceded. We do not accept that anything in existence is composed of the kind of simple entity you have affirmed. The only simple entities that exist are simple bodies, whose parts resemble one another, such as water, fire, air, and the like.

As for something in which nothing is distinguishable from anything else, we do not concede that anything in existence is composed of it. Rather, nothing exists unless one thing within it can be distinguished from another.

If they say:

“That distinguishable thing is itself simple,”

they are told:

“It exists only as part of something else; it is never known in isolation, just as it never exists in isolation.”

It may then be said:

It is well known that the human body is divisible in the sense they describe and that one thing within it can be distinguished from another, while life and sensation pervade the body. What, then, prevents life and knowledge from inhering in the soul, just as life and sensation inhere in the body, even though the body is divisible according to you?

If you say:

“Are life and sensation, then, divisible in your view?”

the reply is:

If by this you mean that one part can remain alive and sentient when separated from another—