and therefore the locus of knowledge is indivisible, because what is divisible cannot inhere in something divisible. (1) \ 1975. This has been discussed at length elsewhere, and some of the errors in this argument have been explained, even though they regard it as a conclusive proof that cannot be refuted. They were further emboldened by the fact that some of their opponents, such as Abū Hāmid and al-Rāzī, failed to provide an adequate answer to it; indeed, Abū Hāmid may even agree with them on this point.

The dispute arises from affirming the existence in external reality of something indivisible in the sense they intend.

It may be said to them:

“We do not concede that there is anything in existence of which no part is distinguishable from another.”

If they ask:

“What about the point?”

They are told:

“The point, the line, the surface, one, two, and three may refer to these quantities abstracted from the things they qualify, or to that which is characterized by them (among)(2) measurable things in external reality.

“If the former is intended, then they exist only in minds, not as concrete entities. In external reality there is no number abstracted from what is numbered, nor any magnitude abstracted from what possesses magnitude (3): no point, line, surface, one, two, or three. Rather, existing things