this very meaning. He cited statements of theirs that make this clear, adopted this position himself, and affirmed the states which (1) others call additional accidents. Thus, the greater part of the dispute came down to terminological matters.

Given this, it is evident that we distinguish taste, color, and smell through our senses: we perceive taste with the mouth, see color with the eye, and smell an odor with the nose, just as we hear sound with the ear. Thus, the organs through which these accidents are perceived differ within us, and the inherent differences among the accidents become apparent through the differing organs that perceive them. This is unlike the knowledge, will, and love that subsist in our souls, for we do not distinguish one from another through different senses. Although the indications by which they are known may differ, such indications can be things external to the person drawing the inference.

This, then, is one of the grounds for distinguishing between attributes perceived by the senses and attributes known through reason. Otherwise, it is evident that the citron and the apple are characterized by their diverse attributes as an objective reality, whether or not we perceive it. It is also evident that the taste of either is not its color, and that its color is not its smell. All these are attributes that subsist in it and differ in their realities, even though the subject in which they subsist and which is characterized by them is one.

Attributes are of two kinds:

One kind does not require life, such as taste, color, and smell.

The other requires life, such as knowledge, will, hearing, and sight.

As for the first kind, its effect does not extend beyond the subject in which it subsists: nothing is characterized by color, smell, or taste except that in which the relevant attribute subsists.