and grant him peace—to Him (1), that the angels descend from His presence, that the Quran descends (2) from Him, and other such consequences affirmed by the Book and the Sunnah, together with whatever is of like import.”

He would be told:

“We do not concede that these consequences do not hold.” (3)

If he says, “Whatever entails these consequences is a body,” he would be told:

“If you mean that it is called a body in ordinary language or in religious usage (4), this is false.

“If, however, you mean that it is a body composed of matter and form, or of indivisible substances (5), this too is not conceded on rational grounds. For even that which all rational people agree is a body—such as stones (6)—we do not concede to be (7) composed in this sense, as has been explained at length elsewhere. What, then, of anything else?

“A full treatment of this requires understanding the rational inquiry into whether a ‘body,’ in the technical sense, is composed according to either of these two theories. This has been discussed at length elsewhere, where it was demonstrated (8) that the positions of both groups are false and contrary to definitive rational proofs. Yet this Imāmī scholar has not cited here the proofs by which he could carry the inquiry through to its conclusion. He has, however, mentioned in his discussion what is appropriate to