that which has no agent and therefore no efficient cause; it may refer to that which needs nothing distinct from itself; and it may refer to that which subsists by itself and needs nothing distinct from itself.

Under the first and second meanings, the attributes are necessarily existent. (1 Under the third meaning, it is the essence qualified by the attributes that is necessarily existent; the attribute alone is not said to be necessarily existent. It may also refer to that which has no relation to anything else, but nothing of this kind exists in external reality. 1). (1)

The proof establishes only that contingent things have an agent who is necessarily existent and subsists (2) by Himself—that is, He is independent of all besides Him. The attribute is not itself the agent.

As for his statement:

“If He has an essence and attributes, He is composite; whatever is composite depends upon its parts, and its parts are other than itself.”

The word “other” is ambiguous. It may mean something separate. Accordingly, two things are “other” (3) if it is possible for one to be separate from the other in time, place, or existence. This is the terminology of the Asharīs and those jurists who agree with them among the followers of the four Imams. Alternatively, two things may be called “other” (4) when neither is the other, or when it is possible (5) to know one while being ignorant of the other. This is the terminology of various groups among the Mu'tazilites, the Karrāmiyya, and others.

As for the Salaf, such as Imam Ahmad and others, they used the word “other” in both senses. For this reason, they did not state without qualification that Allah’s knowledge is other than Him, nor did they state without qualification that it is