(1) See, for example, Ibn Sīnā’s *al-Najāt* (3:243–245), where he devotes a chapter to “The Necessary Existent in Himself Is Intellect, an Intellecting Subject, and an Object of Intellection,” and another (3:245–246) to “He Is in Himself Beloved, Lover, Delightful, and One Who Experiences Delight, and Delight Is the Apprehension of a Congenial Good.” (2) MS (Alif): “It is plainly known by reason that His loving is not His knowing, and that His being loved and known is not the meaning of His being knowing.” MS (Bā): “It is plainly known by reason that His loving is not His being loved, and that His being known is not the meaning of His being knowing.” The adopted reading is from MS (Ayn). (3) The text in parentheses is absent from MSS (Bā) and (Alif). I added *kawnihi* (“His being”) to make the sentence coherent. (4) MSS (Bā) and (Alif): *huwa* (“he/it is”). (5) Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī writes (*Sharh al-Ishārāt*, printed with Ibn Sīnā’s *al-Ishārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt*, ed. Sulaymān Dunyā, vol. 4, pp. 714–715): “Just as an intellecting subject, in apprehending its essence by virtue of its essence, does not require a form of its essence through which it is what it is, it likewise does not, in apprehending what proceeds from its essence by virtue of its essence, require any form other than the form of that which proceeds, through which it is what it is. Consider your own case: you intellect a thing by means of a form that you conceive or call to mind. That form proceeds from you—not from you entirely on your own, but with some participation from something other than you. Even so, you do not intellect that form by means of another form. Rather, just as you intellect the thing through it, you yourself also intellect the form, without the forms within you multiplying. Only your conceptual considerations relating to yourself and to that form may multiply, by way of composition. If this is your state regarding what proceeds from you with the participation of another, what, then, do you suppose is the state of the intellecting subject regarding what proceeds from it by virtue of its essence, without any other being involved? Do not suppose that your being the locus of that form is a condition for your intellecting it; for you intellect your own essence even though you are not its locus. Your being the locus of that form is merely a condition for the form’s being present to you, and that presence is a condition for your intellecting it. If the form becomes present to you in some other manner than by inhering in you, intellection occurs without its inhering in you. It is known that, insofar as it constitutes a thing’s presence to something other than itself, the thing’s presence to its agent is no less than its presence to its recipient. Therefore, the essential effects of an intellecting agent that acts by virtue of its essence are present to it without inhering in it; it thus intellects them without their inhering in it.” See also Sulaymān Dunyā’s introduction to volume 2 of *al-Ishārāt*, pp. 115–116.