the distinction between the affirmation brought by the messengers, which accords with the plain dictates of reason, and the claims of the Jahmiyyah, and the fact that His attributes are included in what His names denote].

Second, it may be said:

This aforementioned position is not that of al-Ash‘arī or the majority of those who agree with him. Rather, it is only the position of the proponents of “states” [among them] (1), who maintain that His being Knowing is a state (2) caused by knowledge. They thereby posit another state (3), which knowledge necessitates and which is not knowledge itself; rather, it (4) is His being Knowing. This is the position of al-Qādī Abū Bakr ibn al-Tayyib and al-Qādī Abū Ya‘lā, as well as Abū al-Ma‘ālī’s initial position (5).

The majority of those who affirm the divine attributes, however, say (6): His knowledge is His being Knowing.

They also say:

No one can be knowing except through knowledge, nor powerful except through power. That is, it is impossible for one who has no knowledge to be knowing, for one who has no power to be powerful, or for one who has no life to be living.

[In their view, His knowledge is His being Knowing, His power is His being Powerful, and His life is His being Living. In reality, this is the position of Abū al-Husayn al-Basrī and other astute members of the Mu‘tazilah] (7).

There is no doubt that this is known by necessity, for the existence of an active participle without the referent of