for mercy depends on all of that. Then, from the boundlessness of His mercy, I inferred that His law is light and mercy itself. For this reason Allah frequently links many legal rulings to His mercy and benevolence, because those rulings arise from mercy and lead to it.
Among them is His statement: “Indeed, Allah commands you to render trusts to their rightful owners, and when you judge between people, judge with justice” (Q 4:58). Once you understand that Allah has ordered the delivery of trusts to their owners, you deduce the obligation to safeguard those trusts, never to neglect, squander, or transgress against them, and that proper delivery is impossible without such care.
Likewise, when you grasp that Allah has commanded judging people with justice, you conclude that every person who adjudicates—whether in great matters or small—must know the subject of his judgment. If he is a general ruler, he must acquire the learning that qualifies him for that office; and if he judges in limited issues, such as resolving marital discord—where Allah instructs us to appoint an arbiter from his family and an arbiter from hers—he must still be knowledgeable about the matters under review and know the path that leads to a correct resolution.
From this very point we infer the obligation of seeking knowledge: it is an individual duty in every matter a servant needs, for Allah has given us many commands and many prohibitions. It is obvious that obeying His commands and avoiding His prohibitions depend on knowing what has been commanded and what has been forbidden. How could a person ignorant of a command fulfil it, or ignorant of a prohibition avoid it?
Similarly, His order that His servants enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong hinges on their knowledge of right and wrong, so that they may call to the former and forbid the latter. Whatever is indispensable for fulfilling a duty becomes itself a duty, and whatever is indispensable for avoiding a prohibition is likewise obligatory.
Thus, knowledge of faith and righteous action must come before performing them, and knowledge of their opposites must likewise precede