of textual evidence—whether it may be cited as proof, like a general statement that has been restricted, the inferred meaning of the wording (dalīl al-khiṭāb), analogy (qiyās), and the like. Matters such as these help to explain some of the scholars’ excuses.
Abu Muḥammad Ibn Ḥazm said:
“Some have maintained that consensus is confined to the consensus of the Companions—may Allah be pleased with them—alone.
Others have said that the consensus of every generation is a sound consensus, provided that no disagreement on the issue preceded it; and this, he says, is the correct view, for when the matter is broken down in detail the scholars agree upon it, cite it as evidence, and cast aside the principles they had formulated against it… Until he said:
‘The definition of consensus is that about which one is certain there is no disagreement among any of the scholars of Islam. We know this in the same way we know reports about which there can be no doubt, such as that the Muslims left the Ḥijāz for Yemen (1), then conquered Iraq, Khurasan, Egypt, and Syria; that the Umayyads ruled for a period, after which the Abbasids ruled; that the battles of Ṣiffīn and al-Ḥarra took place; and the like—matters known with absolute and necessary certainty. (2)
‘In this book we mention only complete consensus, for which there is absolutely no dissenter, knowledge of which is as certain as that the dawn prayer, whether performed in safety or in fear, is two units; that the month of Ramadan falls between Shawwal and Shaʿban; that what is in the written codices is exactly what Muhammad, peace and blessings be upon him, brought and declared to be revelation from Allah; that five camels incur one sheep in alms-due, and similar rulings. Such knowledge becomes self-evident to the inquirer who examines the modes of its transmission; when a person reflects upon it in the light of his own experience in every aspect of life, he finds it firmly rooted within himself.’ (3)
He further said at the end of his Book of Consensus: ‘Everything we have written here is certain and admits no doubt; it is definitive, and it is unlawful for anyone to oppose it in the slightest.’ (4)
I say: Thus, with regard to consensus he has stipulated what many theologians and jurists stipulate, as mentioned earlier: one must know that there is no dissent, and that knowledge of the consensus must come through recurrent transmission. He has classed knowledge of consensus among self-evident truths, like the knowledge derived from most mass-transmitted reports. Yet it is well known that many consensuses