with Muslim captives as shields, and the Muslim army fears disaster should it refrain from shooting, then it is permissible for the soldiers to fire, aiming at the unbelievers, even though that may lead to the death of those protected prisoners. The evil entailed by this is less than the evil of the unbelievers overrunning the Muslim army.
This is the position of the well-known jurists such as Abu Hanifah, al-Shafi‘i, Ahmad, and others.
If, on the other hand, no danger threatens the Muslim army, the permissibility of shooting is a matter on which they hold two opinions:

1. It is permissible—this is the view of Abu Hanifah and some of al-Shafi‘i’s companions.
2. It is impermissible—this is the well-known view in the schools of Ahmad and al-Shafi‘i.
   Likewise, if a man coerces another to destroy someone else’s property, threatening to kill him should he refuse, it is lawful for the coerced person to destroy the property on condition that he guarantee compensation.
   Similarly, when an enemy besieging Muslims demands the wealth of a particular individual and threatens to wipe them out if they do not surrender it, the Muslims may hand over that wealth while remaining liable to reimburse its owner. Many comparable cases could be cited.
   The author—may Allah have mercy on him—mentions consensuses of this sort throughout the book. It was not our intention to pursue every claimed consensus that is known to be invalid, for that would exceed the scope of our discussion. Indeed, most of the consensuses he records are accurate as he reports them and we know of no disagreement about them. Our purpose, rather, is to point out that, despite his extensive knowledge of the scholars’ opinions, his distinction over others in that field, and the stringent conditions he stipulates for any consensus he cites, some of the consensuses he lists are subject to well-known disputes, and in certain instances the preponderant view is actually contrary to what he presents as consensus.
   The reason lies in two claims: first, the pretension to encompass matters that cannot be fully encompassed, and second, the assertion that only an all-encompassing consensus constitutes proof.
   Anyone who makes these two claims and then argues by consensus cannot avoid contradiction. Thus, whoever alleges consensus in arcane matters—meaning that he knows with certainty of no dissent—has ventured into what he has no knowledge of; these are the people Imam Ahmad criticized.
   By contrast, whoever appeals to consensus in the sense that he is unaware of any dissenting view has followed the path of the leading imams; this is the type of consensus they cited as evidence in questions such as these.
   The author concluded the book with a chapter on consensus in matters of creed, pronouncing anyone who rejects it an unbeliever. He said:
   “They are unanimous that Allah alone, without partner, is the Creator of everything other than Him,”