whose meaning is intelligible—terms such as bā’in (irrevocable), battah (absolute), khalīyah (released) and barīyah (clear)—and that, should the husband intend by any of these words a single sunni pronouncement of divorce, it is binding upon him, as we have already explained. ⦗1⦘

He said: “We know of no disagreement that a man who divorces his wife without calling witnesses is still bound by the divorce, though we do not decisively maintain that this constitutes consensus.” ⦗2⦘

I say: He has also stated that when the utterance of divorce is meant as an oath, there are two opinions as to whether it takes effect. As for a divorce deferred to a set time or suspended on a condition—meaning it is not uttered as an oath—he reported unanimous agreement that it is effective.

Yet in his major legal work, Sharḥ al-Muḥallā, he adopted the opposite position and rebuked those who claimed consensus on the point. Likewise, he maintained that a divorce expressed through an indirect allusion does not take effect, insisting that it is valid only when the explicit word “divorce” is used—a view held by the Rāfiḍah, who also say that no divorce is valid unless witnessed.

In that book he censures anyone who asserts consensus on each of these issues—as is his habit in such matters—although here he has himself cited consensus, subject to the aforementioned conditions. That there is consensus on this point is, in fact, among the clearest instances where consensus is claimed. Yet elsewhere he contradicts matters that are agreed upon by the overwhelming majority of scholars and denies that they are consensual—such as his assertion that reclining on one’s right side after the two pre-dawn units is obligatory and that the prayer of whoever neglects it is invalid; and his claim that it is obligatory in the first tashahhud to recite the supplication: “O Allah, I seek refuge in You from the punishment of the grave, from the punishment of the Fire, from the trial of life and death, and from the trial of the Messiah, the Antichrist.” The fact that these are not obligatory is more plainly known by consensus than most of the matters he records. Indeed, were someone to say, “The ummah has unanimously agreed that no supplication is legislated in the first tashahhud,” such a claim of consensus would be acceptable—let alone alleging that this specific supplication is obligatory therein and that the prayer of one who omits it is invalid. It is only