his dependents; and if he practices a craft, he is to be left the tools of that craft. ʿAbd Allāh—Aḥmad’s son—narrated from him that he said: “Everything is to be sold except the dwelling, the garments that conceal his nakedness, and the servant, provided he is an elderly man or incapacitated and needs the servant.” Thus he did not exempt the means by which one earns a living, in line with the majority.
He said: They are unanimously agreed that a female slave’s master is not compelled to marry her off, nor to have intercourse with her—even if she asks for it—nor to sell her because he prevents her from intercourse and marriage. (1)
I say: The explicit, well-known position of Aḥmad is that when a female slave requests to be married, her master may satisfy her himself; otherwise he is obliged to grant her request. The same applies if she is one of those unlawful for him; and the same ruling holds for a male slave.
According to al-Shāfiʿī, if she is unlawful for him, whether he must comply with her request is a matter of two opinions.
He said: They are unanimously agreed that hinting at a proposal to a woman during her waiting period is lawful when that period is other than a revocable divorce, or when it is the waiting period of widowhood. (2)
I say: Concerning a woman whose waiting period is irrevocable because of a triple divorce, or of fewer than three pronouncements—such as a woman who has obtained khulʿ—there are three views in the Ḥanbalī school and two in the Shāfiʿī school:
- It is permissible to make an indirect proposal; this is also the view of Mālik and one of the two reports from al-Shāfiʿī.
- It is not permissible.
- It is permissible only in the case of triple divorce, for she is forbidden to her former husband—as is every woman who is unlawful to him—but not permissible when the divorce is fewer than three because she may still return to him; this is the second report from al-Shāfiʿī.
He said: They are unanimously agreed that a divorce deferred to a stated time or tied to a condition is valid if that time coincides with a period in which divorce is permissible; they then differed as to the moment it takes effect—some maintaining that it takes place immediately, others that it takes place only at its appointed time. (3)
They are unanimously agreed that if the appointed time itself falls within a period when divorce is permissible, the divorce has indeed occurred.
They differed over whether a divorce uttered in the form of an oath is binding or not.
They are unanimously agreed that the recognised expressions of divorce do constitute a divorce, and that every derivative formulation