her own marriage, this is a weak, untenable view. The sound position, established by the proofs, is to the contrary, and it is impermissible to act upon that opinion.

As for the particular case she describes, and the fact that her view clashes with her father’s—because her father wants for her a husband of honorable lineage and social standing who is her equal, whereas she inclines toward marrying a man she considers devout even though he possesses neither pedigree nor status—the right is with her father. His judgement is broader than hers, and she may fancy that this man is suitable for her when he is not. Therefore, she may not oppose her father so long as he is looking after her welfare.

If, however, it is firmly established that this suitor is indeed suitable for her and matches her in rank, family, and religiosity, yet her father still refuses to marry her to him, then he becomes an obstructive guardian (ʿāḍil). In that case, the guardianship passes to the next eligible guardian. Even so, this transfer must be handled by a sharīʿah judge, who will move the guardianship from the obstructive father to the next guardian. She herself has no authority to act, nor may any of her other guardians act, without her father’s consent; recourse must be made to the Islamic court. The judge will study the matter and its circumstances, and if he deems transferring the guardianship to another guardian to be in her best interest, he will do so.

Marriage matters must be carefully regulated, and women must remain under the care of their guardians. A woman’s perspective is limited, whereas her male guardians possess a degree of concern for her protection and honor that she herself does not have. This must therefore be taken into account. And Allah knows best.