many people may nevertheless need such proofs when their innate disposition has been altered by circumstances that affect it.

As for the term [Perfect], al-Ash'arī related that al-Jubbā'ī would not permit Allah to be called perfect. He would say:

“The perfect is that which consists of parts joined together.”

If this dispute concerns the meaning, it is false; but if it concerns only the wording, it is merely a verbal dispute.

The point here is that His perfection and His freedom from imperfections are known through reason.

A group of theologians, including Abū al-Ma'ālī, al-Rāzī, al-Āmidī, and others, claimed that this can be known only through revealed evidence—in this case, consensus—and that His freedom from defects and imperfections can likewise be known only through consensus. They maintained that their sole method for negating from Him whatever they negated was to deny that the designation “body,” and similar terms, applied to Him. In this they departed from the position held by the leading attribute-affirming theologians, such as al-Ash'arī, al-Qādī, Abū Bakr, and Abū Ishāq, as well as by the early generations and imams before them: namely, affirming His hearing, sight, and speech through rational proofs and declaring Him free of imperfections through rational proofs.

Consequently, these theologians came to rely solely upon revealed evidence to affirm these attributes. They argue:

“If we affirm these attributes on the basis of negating defects, while defects can be negated only by consensus—which is a revealed proof—and consensus itself can be established only through revealed proofs from the Quran and Sunnah, then,” they say, “the texts affirming hearing, sight, and speech are stronger than the verses indicating that consensus is authoritative. It is therefore more fitting and appropriate to rely from the outset upon revealed evidence—namely, the Quran—to affirm them.”