then the former would be more perfect than the latter. The absence of such acts is therefore necessarily an imperfection, while their existence insofar as it is possible is perfection.

Fifth, it may be said:

We do not concede that their nonexistence in absolute terms is either imperfection or perfection, nor that their existence in absolute terms is either imperfection or perfection. Rather, their existence at the time dictated by His will, power, and wisdom is perfection, while their existence otherwise is an imperfection. Their nonexistence when wisdom dictates their nonexistence is perfection, just as their existence when wisdom dictates their existence is perfection.

Since one and the same thing may sometimes be a perfection by its existence and at other times an imperfection—and the same applies to its nonexistence—this absolute division is invalid. Similarly, something may be a mercy to created beings when they need it, such as rain, yet a punishment when it harms them. Sending it down when they need it is mercy and beneficence, and the Beneficent and Merciful is characterized by perfection. Yet not sending it down when it would harm them is no imperfection; rather, that too is mercy and beneficence. Thus, He is beneficent by bringing it into existence when its existence is a mercy, and by withholding it when its nonexistence is a mercy.