then it would contain something that is in potentiality, while itself being what brings it into actuality. This would entail that it be either receptive or active, which they deny because they deem the attributes they call “composition” impossible.
If, however, something other than it brought it into actuality, that would be impossible by necessity and consensus, because it is incompatible with necessary existence and because it entails a circle of concomitance and an infinite regress among efficient causes. If it itself became the agent of a particular effect after not having been so, it could not be an eternal complete cause. Thus, the pre-eternity of anything in the world would entail His having been a complete cause in pre-eternity, which in turn would entail that nothing could arise from Him, whether through an intermediary or without one. This contradicts what is observed.
Second, in refutation of those who hold the occurrence of temporal events to be impossible, it may be said:
This rests on these matters being renewed through the renewal of relations, states, and privations, for everyone agrees that such matters are renewed. Al-Āmidī distinguished between the two merely in wording, saying:
“These are temporal events, whereas those are renewals.”
But verbal distinctions do not affect objective realities.
It may therefore be said:
If the renewal of these renewals entailed a perfection for Him, He lacked it beforehand, and that is an imperfection. If it entailed an imperfection, He could not be characterized by it.
Third, it may be said:
The perfection with which He must be characterized is one whose existence is possible. As for what is impossible, it is not a perfection with which any existent can be characterized. The temporal events connected with His power and will cannot all exist in pre-eternity. Their nonexistence in pre-eternity is therefore not an imperfection, because the nonexistence of what is impossible is no imperfection.
Fourth, it may be said:
Suppose one essence performs one act after another and is capable of acting by itself, while another essence cannot do anything by itself but is like an inanimate object that cannot move,